A hazard is anything with the capacity to cause harm. Hazards can be physical like a sharp knife or non-physical like a stressful environment where the stressor is abstract.

A hazardous item or condition causes harm when the person harmed interacts with the hazard without appropriate hazard controls.

Hazard controls are measures designed to isolate the connection between a hazard and the harm it is capable of causing. Hazard control measures are context-dependent and focused on this connection.

For example, noise hazards can be controlled by isolating the harmful noise levels reaching anyone that may be harmed. This control doesn't remove the continued latent capacity of that noise source, but it severs the link between the noise and the people that may be harmed.

Hazard identification is a systematic approach for identifying the hazards associated with an activity.

Hazard identification processes are used in risk management to delineate the specific hazards that require specific assessment and controls. This is a common early step in the process of conducting effective risk assessments.

Since a hazard's capacity to cause harm is contextual, hazard identification must be contextual.

For example, noise hazards associated with office refurbishment works must be contextualised. For works taking place during office hours, harmful noise levels make the list of hazards. Conversely, for the same activity taking place outside office hours, harmful noise is omitted from the list.

Risk assessment is a systematic process of quantifying the likelihood of a hazard causing harm and the severity of such harm.

A risk assessment starts with a thorough understanding of the activities / condition to be assessed, then a contextualised list of hazards, then an assessment of the likelihood of each hazard causing harm, then an assessment of the severity of any resulting harm.

Whilst the main deliverable from a risk assessment process is the assessment of hazard-to-harm potential, it is standard industry practice to incorporate appropriate risk control measures for each hazard-to-harm potential identified.

Risk control measures are context dependent; incorporating all the factors affecting the likelihood and severity of the harm assessed.

For example, fire risk control measures for sleeping accommodations are more extensive than those in non-sleeping accommodations because of the poorer reaction time associated with sleep. The same hazard, the same potential victim but vastly different contexts.

The safety culture of an organisation is defined by its collective ethos and values. Strong safety cultures engender safe operations through disciplined adherence, whereas weak safety cultures permit risky operations through overlooked or unchallenged practices.

Safety culture is an emergent property, observable over time, rather than a methodology that can be instantly implemented and measured in real time.

Whilst there is no standard definition for Safety Culture, it was first used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a 1991 IAEA report in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

That report, entitled 'Safety Culture' defined it as: "Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance"

The IAEA has evolved its approach from the theoretical concept of safety culture through the more practical concept of Culture for Safety, describing it as "...a concept describing the priority and value put on safety by the members of an organization’s overall culture."

The organisation acknowledges various factors influencing safety culture, ranging from collective beliefs—like the assumption that Japanese nuclear power plants were immune to disasters akin to Chernobyl, a notion debunked by the Fukushima incident—to the impact of hierarchical work environments, as evidenced by Korea's aviation safety record in the 1990s.

Within the ArchDAMS framework factors affecting safety culture are intricately woven into the design of the safety management system. This integration not only bolsters discipline but also highlights and transparently addresses minor faults before they escalate into significant operational risks.